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EMERGING COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT TRENDS: A SURVEY
ALEXANDER W. SIERCK*
A business commentator recently observed pridefully that "[t]o
the list of famous U.S. exports such as ice cream, Coca Cola, jazz and
the assembly line, must now be added another: the concept of antitrust."' However, examination of this development suggests that anti-

trust is one export that is proving to be a mixed blessing to United
States business.
The European operations of an increasing number of United States
firms have been recent targets of Common Market antitrust enforcement activity. This trend is likely to continue. The purpose of this
article is to put this trend in context by surveying those areas of
Common Market antitrust enforcement and policy planning likely to be
most active, as well as those areas less likely to present business
ventures in the Common Market with additional antitrust problems.
The focus of this article centers upon Common Market antitrust
law as embodied in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 2 An
initial overview of the Common Market's antitrust objectives and
enforcement mechanism will be followed by a survey of likely areas of
present and possible future antitrust vulnerability under article 85 (two
firms acting in concert to distort competition), including a special
discussion of present and proposed patent licensing restrictions. Thereafter, activity deemed an abuse of a dominant position by a single firm
prohibited under article 86 will be reviewed. This article also includes
a discussion of the merger regulations proposed by the Common
Market's antitrust enforcement authorities and a review of that group's
recent study of the competitive behavior of the major oil companies.
Throughout its development, this article attempts to give some guidance to United States firms regarding expected reasons for and directions of the future evolution of Common Market antitrust law.
*
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1. Jones, Executive Guide to Antitrust in Europe, HARV. Bus. REV. 106 (1976).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter cited as the Treaty of Rome]. This article will use the
unofficial English translation as contained in I COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 151.
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I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMON MARKET'S
ANTITRUST GOALS

In April, 1972, the Commission of the European Communities,
which serves as the Common Market's antitrust regulatory body,
issued its first annual report on Common Market antitrust policies and
enforcement activities. 3 This official report and its annual successors
provide essential background for analysis of enforcement trends and
prediction of future evolution because they contain the Commission's
interpretation of Common Market antitrust developments. In the introduction to its first report, the Commission announced that its primary goal was to promote the integration of the separate economies of
member states into a unified "common market".' This goal is signifi-

cant to antitrust law insofar as it requires the elimination of restrictive
practices which interfere with that integration and favors policies
which encourage firms to expand their operations throughout the
Common Market.
This goal remains the paramount factor governing the application
of Common Market antitrust law. Extensive implementation already
has been achieved by the gradual elimination of the more overt restrictions upon the ability of firms to sell throughout the Common Market.
Still, the Commission's antitrust enforcement authorities are likely to
expand their regulatory horizons to more controversial areas such as
promotion of greater economic self-determination. In the broad areas
of market structure and behavior especially, this expansion is'likely to
impact heavily upon United States based multinationals with prominent market positions in Europe, since in the years ahead a highly
concentrated product market, led or dominated by such multinationals,
will be inviting targets for the Commission's regulatory authorities.
This development will not entail the Commission's abandonment
of its traditional enforcement priorities. The Commission will remain
quick to take action to remove barriers to the achievement of a truly
common market such as market divisions and customer allocations
along national lines or exclusive distributorships with absolute territorial restrictions. Thus, firms both foreign and local to the Common
Market will continue to be confronted by Commission action if restrictions of this sort are uncovered.
3. Commission of the European Communities, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY (1972) [hereinafter cited as FIRST ANNUAL REPORT].
4. Id. at 13.
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Perhaps of greater long term importance to United States business
is that the Commission in the future probably will reaffirm its commitment, as revealed in its prior statements and decisions, to encourage
those forms of horizontal cooperation among relatively small and
medium sized firms which are likely to enhance their ability to compete with larger units, especially United States based multinationals.
Indeed, the staff of the Commission recognizes that this "need to
balance the benefits generated by size and sometimes by restrictive
practices against the price to be paid in terms of decreased or
threatened competition [is] the most delicate aspect" of the Commission's regulatory role. 5 It is in making this delicate balance that future
Commission antitrust enforcement policy may appear to be more
vigorously applied against United States based firms than against those
based in the Common Market.
In predicting the course of Common Market antitrust enforcement, one must always be mindful of the areas and extent of enforcement which will help promote a true common market among member
states. This is especially important because experience has shown that
the Commission's application of its laws depends more on policy
considerations than on statutory construction. 6 Because there is no
right under the Treaty of Rome to bring private antitrust enforcement
actions, 7 the Commission's policy considerations are not only important, they are virtually dispositive of resolution of antitrust issues.
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty form the basic provisions
of the Common Market's antitrust law. Article 85 proscribes traditional forms of collusion between or among firms, where such agreements may affect trade or distort competition. Cooperative agreements
are commonly overt, and pursuant to the Rome Treaty must be filed
with the Commission for review. Article 86 proscribes the abuse by a
single firm of its dominant position in a portion of the Common
Market. The antimonopoly premise of article 86 is a likely basis for
5. Schlieder, Recent Antitrust Developments in the European Community, 31
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 315 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schlieder]. Mr. Schlieder is the
EEC's Director General for Competition.
6. Hawk, Antitrust in the EEC-The First Decade, 41 F1ORDHAM L. REV. 229, 231
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hawk].
7. There is no explicit provision in the Rome Treaty, or in the Commission
regulations promulgated under it, providing for private injunctive or damage actions
before the Commission or the Court of Justice. However, under article 3 of Commission
regulation 17, any person may request the Commission to require the offending party to
terminate an illegal practice. There is no implied right to a private action under the Rome
Treaty because of the existence of this administrative remedy under article 3 of regulation 17. CROT-rE, TRADING UNDER EEC AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 24 (1977).
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future challenges to powerful multinationals. Before describing the
development of the law under articles 85 and 86, it will be useful first
to review the Commission's antitrust enforcement mechanism and
procedures.
II.

ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST

LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Commission of European Communities is the major source of
Common Market antitrust policy, Based in Brussels, the Commission
is a semi-permanent cadre of thirteen professionals, most of whom
have an economic and business, rather than legal, background. Members of the Commission are appointed by and are subject to the control
of the Council of Ministers, which in turn is comprised of representatives of the cabinets of the member states. The Commission engages in
prosecutorial, judicial and legislative rule making functions in much
the same manner as does the United States Federal Trade Commission.
The Commission's adjudicated decisions are subject to review by
the Commission's Court of Justice. The Court requires the Commission to state fully the reasons upon which it bases its decisions. If a
Commission decision follows well established precedent, the reasons
may be brief; however, if the decision goes well beyond established
precedent, the Commission must give full account. 8
The staff of the Commission closely follows antitrust developments in all of the industrialized nations. Moreover, the Commission staff cooperates extensively and exchanges enforcement information with United States antitrust authorities, particularly the Foreign
Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice. Certain important current examples of this cooperation are
noted in later discussion.
The Commission has two major enforcement sanctions. It may
enter cease and desist orders. In addition, or in the alternative, it may
impose penalties of up to either one million units of account 9 or ten
percent of a firm's previous year's sales, in the case of willful violations such as price fixing by international cartels. Although this potential penalty is substantially greater than its equivalent under United
States law, it should be noted again that the Rome Treaty, unlike
8. Foundaries Roubaix v. Foundaries A. Roux, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8341.
9. A unit of account is roughly equivalent to one United States dollar. E. KINTER
& M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 193 (1976). However, with the
advent of the floating exchange rates pursuant to the Smithsonian accord, the exact
exchange rate flucfuates in relation to the dollar's relative value. In 1976, one unit of
account was equivalent to approximately $1.15.
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United States law, does not enable parties to bring private damage
actions against firms which have violated articles 85 or 86, or to
receive damages incurred as a consequence. Commission antitrust
enforcement is achieved primarily through voluntary compliance with
Commission requests made following an investigation, rather than as a
result of litigation. °
The Commission also may fine firms that fail to supply the
Commission with relevant information in connection with an antitrust
investigation." While there have been few reported cases of fines,
firms should nevertheless be mindful that, just. as in the United States,
unexcused dilatory or incomplete document production may have
adverse monetary as well as tactical consequences.
Commission antitrust policy is also revealed through its power
under article 85(3) to exempt restrictive agreements which would
otherwise run afoul of article 85(1). Under Commission regulations,
agreements within the scope of article 85 must be registered with the
Commission unless the agreement falls into a category exempted from
this requirement. A firm is subject to penalty if discovered to have
failed to register a nonexempt agreement. Once registered, the agreement, at least in theory, enjoys provisional validity until the Commission's contrary decision issues. However, a party to the agreement
may still assert the invalidity of a provision of the agreement during
this period. Moreover, a contrary decision means that the agreement
retroactively is deemed a nullity.
The public does not have access to agreements registered pursuant
to article 85(3). Although there has been a remarkable expansion in the
United States of the public's ability to obtain access to government
10. For example, in 1971, the Commission rendered twelve decisions in which it
applied either article 85 or 86 while resolving 2,873 matters by informal agreement.
Hawk, supra note 6, at 238.
11. The Commission levies such fines pursuant to article II of regulation 17/62. For
example, the Commission on June 25, 1976, formally ordered the Dutch agency for
nitrogenous fertilizers, CSV, to supply it within eighty days with data on its commercial
activities and relations with manufacturers whose products it sells or face a fine of 1000
units per day for each day until the data is supplied. Interestingly, CSV asserted as the
basis for its refusal to furnish the data the fact that the members of its staff authorized to
supply the information were also directors of the European cartel of manufacturers of
nitrogenous fertilizers, Nitrex, which was headquartered in Switzerland. CSV considered that compliance with the Commission's request for information could lead to
criminal proceedings against such persons under Swiss law for disclosure to a foreign
party or private organization secrets relating to a Swiss business. In the Commission's
view, the fact that information has been supplied voluntarily to an international cartel
governed by the law of a nonmember country in no way affects the right of the
Commission to receive such information.
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documents, it is unlikely that this trend will arise in the near future in
the Common Market, especially with respect to agreements that are
arguably confidential business arrangements.
While much of the Commission's enforcement workload is
generated by agreements registered under article 85(3), complaints
from other parties also have triggered the Commission's investigatory
processes. The Commission encourages the filing of such complaints
and has issued a special form for use by complainants seeking the
initiation of a Commission investigation. Foreign firms might avail
themselves of this device just as effectively as have European firms,
especially by bringing to Commission attention conduct which in a
similar context in other countries has already been adjudged illegal, or
at least has become the subject of a governmental investigation.
Common Market antitrust law is not developed by case law alone.
Article 87 of the Rome Treaty empowers the Commission to issue
regulations of general applicability having the force of law. Its regulations are subject to approval by the Council of Ministers before
becoming effective.' 2 Also, the Commission periodically issues the
equivalent of advisory opinions.
Finally, Common Market antitrust law is developed in the courts
and administrative agencies of member nations. Article 17 of the
Rome Treaty enables member nations to apply the standards of article
85 internally to any agreement which has not been registered with the
Commission or taken under investigation by the Commission. Member
nations are not empowered to grant exemptions, except through a
member state's courts if an agreement is a subject of litigation before
13
it.
III.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE

85 AGAINST

RESTRICTIVE CONCERTED PRACTICES

A.

Threshold Considerations

Article 85, like its United States counterpart, section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 4 cannot be invoked unless there is an allegation of an
agreement or concerted practice.' 5 However, the Court of Justice in its
12. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 87(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 14,49, 1 COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 2201.
13. Id., art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. at 76; Amsterdam Bulb, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8391.
14. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
15. Article 85 provides as follows:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
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1972 Dyestuffs opinion, 16 a price fixing case, held that a concerted
practice for purposes of article 85(1) can be something less than a
formal agreement if it can be shown that there is a causal connection
between common intent and established conduct. In the Dyestuffs
case, the Court found that several European firms had divided the
Common Market into five national dyestuffs markets having different
price levels and structures. In finding a violation of article 85, the
Court simply inferred that it was highly improbable that contemporaneous price increases in all five national markets could have been
17
spontaneous rather than the result of some common understanding.
In making a case under article 85, it is essential to show concerted
action by two unrelated firms. Contrary to United States law, the
Commission has rejected unequivocally the intra-enterprise or bathtub
conspiracy doctrine, at least in cases in which the subsidiary cannot
8
undertake economic behavior independent of the parent.'
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market, in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; [sic] which
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 85 (1)-(3), 298 U.N.T.S. 23, 69-70, 1 COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH)
2205, 2041, 2051.
16. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. EEC Comm'n, [1972] C. J. Comm. E.
Rec. 619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, aff'g Dyestuffs
Mfgrs., 12 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L198) 11 (1969), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 9314.
17. Id. at 8029.
18. Christiani & Nielson, 12 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L165) 12 (1969), [1965-1969
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308; Beguelin Import Co. v. G. L. Import
Export Co., 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8249. See also Centrafarm B. V. & Adriaan de
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Article 85 also requires a showing of "perceptible" effect on
trade between member states. In most instances this means that the
firms involved, including parents or subsidiaries, must have an aggregate of $15 million sales annually if manufacturers, and $20 million if
distributors or trading companies. In either case, the firms must carry
on at least five percent of the business in the goods affected by the
restrictions or in their substitutes in the relevant market (which need
not always be the entire Common Market).1 9 Price fixing occurring
only in a single member state also may be covered by article 85 in that
such an agreement is likely to reinforce the compartmentalization of
20
markets on a national basis.
As noted above, the Commission provides under article 85(3) for
exemptions covering certain types of agreements that might otherwise
be illegal under article 85(1). Exemptions under article 85(3) are often
given to joint research and development efforts, specialization agreements which divide production tasks, joint advertising agreements,
and occasionally joint buying agreements. Consistent with its overall
policy of promoting expansion efforts by smaller or medium sized
firms, the Commission is most likely to exempt joint efforts by such
firms, which presumably have a greater need for them than do established multinationals.
These exemptions form an important part of Common Market
antitrust law and policy, but are not generally available for public
scrutiny. This is indicative of the larger problem of limited access to all
that constitutes Common Market antitrust law and policy. For example, Commission and Court of Justice antitrust opinions tend to be
more conclusive and less factual and analytical than their United States
counterparts. Furthermore, the Commission does not publish many of
its opinions.
In short, numerous decisions affecting the welfare of European consumers are made in Brussels, yet there is no way
Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246.
This case states as dicta that arrangements between component parts of an economic
unit do not come under article 85 to the extent that such arrangements constitute a
division of functions within an economic unit.
19. Notice of May 27, 1970, Concerning Agreements, Decisions and Concerted
Practices of Minor Importance, 13 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. C64) 1 (1970), [1958-1972
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9367. This de minimis provision is not
binding on the Court of Justice. Furthermore, in its decision in Advocaat Zwarte Kip, 17
0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L237) 12 (1974), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP..
(CCH) 9669, at 9493-11, the Commission stated that its notice was only for guidance.
20. Fabricants do Papiers Plient v. EEC Comm'n, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

8335. This case involved price fixing by members of a trade association of Belgian
producers and importers of wallpaper.
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interested scholars or citizens can review them to ascertain
independently whether they are sound. 2
B. Specific Examples of ProhibitedConduct
1. Horizontal Market Division. The Commission's first enforcement priority under article 85 is the policing of market sharing
agreements because of their obvious anticompetitive effects as well as
their obstruction of the goal of market integration. Likewise, the
Commission condemns delivery and sales quotas based on total Common Market sales as practices likely to reinforce illegal market sharing
arrangements. 22

The basic prohibition in article 85 against horizontal market allocation also bars the use of patent, copyright or trademark rights under
national law in an attempt to partition the Common Market with
respect to trade in a given product. In the Sirena case the Court of
Justice held that a trademark assigned by a United States manufacturer
could not be used by its Italian assignee to block imports into Italy
from West Germany where the goods also had been trademarked under
a parallel license from the United States manufacturer.23
24
Later in 1971, the Court of Justice in Deutsche Grammophon
held that because the Rome Treaty mandated the free movement of
goods within the Common Market, a West German firm could not use
its sound reproduction rights to bar resales within West Germany of
recordings originally delivered to a French distributor even though
Deutsche Grammophon, as the record producer, had an exclusive
distribution right under the German copyright act. 25 The Commission
has interpreted the Court's Deutsche Grammophon decision as giving
it a broad delegation of authority to challenge the use of industrial
property rights to hinder trade across the boundaries of member states
26
or to isolate national markets.
21. Scherer, Secrecy, the Rule of Reason, and European Merger Control Policy, 19
ANTITRUST BULL. 181, 194 (1974).

22.

See generally, Commission Communication of Jan. 24, 1966, [1965-1969 Trans-

fer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

9085.

23. Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH, [1971] C. J.Comm. E. Rec. 69, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101. See discussion of the Grundig-Consten case in
text p. 20, infra.
24. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH &
Co. KG, [1971] C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH)

8106.

25. The practical effect of the Commission's opinion is revealed by the fact that in
the five years since the DG opinion, German phonograph record prices have fallen
fifteen percent. Commission of the European Communities, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT].
26. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 70; Hawk, supra note 6, at 276.
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2. Horizontal Price Fixing. Article 85 clearly prohibits price
fixing when it occurs either as part of a market division scheme or
among firms in more than one member state. However, article 85 only
reaches price fixing in a single member state if the involved enterprises
control a significant portion of the total market.27
Horizontal price fixing, unlike horizontal market division, is not
revealed on the face of agreements filed with the Commission. Rather,
as in the case of recurring United States examples, such agreements
are typically clandestine and thus only come to light through an informer or by close economic analysis of pricing patterns. Although the
Commission has not brought many price fixing actions, its enforcement capabilities will likely become more extensive and sophisticated
as it gains experience in this area.
3. Joint Selling Agreements. The Commission's general position, as described in the First Annual Report, is that joint selling
arrangements among competitors violate article 85.28 In Nederlandse
29 the Commission
Cement-Handelsmaatschappij,
declared illegal the
establishment by German cement producers of a joint agency for
selling cement to the Benelux countries. There are, however, instances
suggested in the First Annual Report where joint selling arrangements
will be permitted, especially if the involved firms are small or medium
sized.3" Such agreements normally would be of the sort filed with the
Commission and would therefore be subject to relatively prompt detection, if in fact a negative clearance were not sought.
4. Joint Ventures. Although under Commission practice the
legality of a merger is measured only against the standards of article
86, joint ventures are scrutinized under both articles 85 and 86. For
joint ventures:
The crucial question is whether the cooperation of the
framework of the common subsidiary is likely to restrict or
lessen competition. The answer depends on the circumstances of the case. As long as the parent companies or one
of them still operate in the geographic and product market of
the common subsidiary, restrictions in this sense of Article
85 are probable. This may also be true in cases where the
parent companies and the joint venture are present in different but economically connected markets (raw material, semi27.
28.
29.
30.
Binder]

FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-30.

Id. at 31-32.
Hawk, supra note 6, at 252.
See, e.g., SAFCO, 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L13) 44 (1972), [1970-1972 Transfer
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9487.
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finished product, final product). Even in cases where neither
parent company has ever operated in the market of the joint
venture, restrictive effects may be found, if we can prove a
likelihood that each of the parent companies would have
entered that market separately."
Increased regulation of joint ventures is likely, particularly those
involving large United States firms seeking to establish or perpetuate
major market positions. Upon consummation, virtually all joint venture agreements, unlike price fixing agreements, are likely to be made
known to the Commission as well as to the business community at
large.
5. Collective Agreements For Reciprocal Exclusive Dealing.
The reciprocal dealing arrangements challenged by the Commission
typically have involved parties enjoying a substantial share of the
market within a particular state. 32
6. Agreements For Rebate On Total Turnover. Under article
85 the Commission also has attacked agreements by which producers
in one member state agree to give the same discounts to customers at
collectively fixed rates, based upon a customer's total purchases during a specified period from all of the producers who are parties to the
33
agreement.
7. Exclusive Buying And Selling Agreements. In GrundigConsen, 34 the Commission's first major antitrust case, the Court upheld the Commission's prohibition of absolute territorial protections in
31. Schlieder, supra note 5, at 328. Upon review of its previous joint venture
rulings, the Commission observed that in order to determine whether article 85(3)
sanctions a joint venture, the Commission must ask "whether the joint venture offers
substantial objective benefits to offset the disadvantages to competition." Commission
of the European Communities, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 38-41 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as the SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT]. To this end, the Commission then
observed that it
will generally tend to take an unfavorable view whenever joint ventures are
formed by large firms in different Member States with the object or effect of
coordinating their conduct in the market. Exemption will also be refused
where there is no need for close cooperation between the firms to take the
form of a joint venture, as where the benefits of an agreement could be
achieved by less restrictive means.
Id. at 40.
32. Hawk, supra note 6, at 254.
33. Id.
34. Etablissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs, GmbH v. EEC Comm'n,
[1966] C. J.Comm. E. Rec. 429, [1961-1966 Court Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8046.
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an exclusive distributorship agreement between a German manufacturer and its exclusive distributor for sales in France. The Court refused to
permit the French supplemental trademark held by the French distributor to be used to block parallel imports from West Germany.
Thereafter, the Commission issued regulation 67/67 which granted a blanket exemption to certain types of bilateral exclusive distribution agreements complying with specified conditions, primarily the
absence of any restrictions on parallel imports or reexports across
member state boundaries.3 5 Under article 2(1) of regulation 67/67 only
two kinds of competitive restrictions may be imposed upon an exclusive dealer:
(1) the obligation not to manufacture or distribute competing
products during the life of the contract and one year thereafter, and (2) the obligation not to take positive steps-such as
setting up a warehouse or3 6advertising in another territory-to
sell outside the territory.
This early and strict enforcement has apparently resulted in the
elimination of the majority of absolute territorial restrictions brought to
the Commission's attention. Indeed, most manufacturers have modified voluntarily their exclusive distributorships in the face of this
vigorous enforcement policy. 37 Moreover, future agreements of this
nature are likely to be detected by the Commission staff promptly upon
filing.
8. Selective Distributorships. Selective systems of distribution limited to a number of "approved" resellers have also come under
Commission scrutiny. If a manufacturer has a strong market position,
the Commission is more likely to strike the system down. 38 The
35. Regulation No. 67/67, 10 J. 0. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967), 1 COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 2727. The Commission extended the life of regulation No. 67/67 another ten
years as of December 1, 1972. 14 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L276) 15 (1972). See Draft of
Regulation to Amend Regulation No. 67/67, EEC Comm'n Press Release [No. IP (72)
137], [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9517, at 9155. In 1976, the
Commission proposed a number of amendments to regulation 67/67 to conform them to
recent Court of Justice rulings. In particular, the breadth of a territory that may be
subject to an exclusive dealing arrangement has been proposed not to exceed a population area of 100 million, the same limit as is proposed for exclusive patent licenses. SIXTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 31, at 19-20.

36. Osterweil, Developing EEC Antitrust Law in the Field of Distribution Under
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 77, 86 (1976) [hereinafter cited

as Osterweil].
37. Hawk, supra note 6, at 268.
38. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 63-65. "An enterprise [doing business
in the Common Market] which does not hold a dominant position is, of course, free to
choose its customers at its own discretion." Schlieder, supra note 5, at 320.
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Commission also distinguishes between quantitative criteria of selection, which it disfavors, and qualitative criteria based on objective and
uniform grounds, generally found permissible. 39 The latter criteria may
include restricting distribution to a small group of dealers who are
usually experts in handling highly technical and relatively expensive
products.40
The Commission's Competition Director, Willy Schlieder, recently reconfirmed this approach. He believes that
it is necessary to draw a dividing line between cases in which
the producer intends to insure a certain minimum standing of
the marketed goods and sales outlets[,] but not to limit the
number of dealers, and cases of quantitative selection where
the producer decides, as a matter of marketing policy and in
cooperation with the dealers, to distribute his goods only
through a given number of dealers and subdealers.4'
In Schlieder's view, the latter form of agreement limiting the number
of dealers is violative of article 85(1), although it nevertheless may
qualify for an exemption under article 85(3).
In 1975, the Commission clarified its policy as to selective distributorships in a case involving SABA, a subsidiary of United States
based General Telephone & Electronics Co. 4 2 SABA, which manufactures televisions, radios and tape recorders, sells them throughout the
Common Market through a network of selected independent distributors. Under the SABA plan, a qualified dealer must maintain a so
called specialized shop, or if a department store, a radio and television
department and repair facilities. Furthermore, a SABA-selected dealer
is required to undertake various promotional activities and meet certain
sales targets. The standard contracts also prevent an authorized dealer
from reselling to an unauthorized dealer.
The Commission granted the SABA distribution system an exemption even though it had reservations as to the anticompetitive
nature of the restrictions imposed upon the dealers. The Commission
apparently viewed the agreements as helping to rationalize production
and distribution, with the consumer reaping the ultimate benefit. Spe39. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 63-64; Hawk, supra note 6, at 272.
40. See, e.g., Omega, 13 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L242) 22 (1970), 1 COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 2061.86, where the Commission granted an exception to the Swiss watchmaker, Omega, whose system not only contained, based on certain objective conditions--expert knowledge and exhibition facilities, but also restricted the number of
retailers in relation to the number of area prospective customers.
41. Schlieder. supra note 5, at 319 (emphasis in the original).
42. SABA, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L28) 19 (1976), 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9802.
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cifically, the Commission found "cost savings through improved
production and sales planning" while the consumer also was assured
of the "ready availability of high quality equipment meeting market
demand and his own specific requirements," in addition to satisfactory
43
after-sales service for these technically complex goods.
The Commission, however, did impose the requirement that
SABA report to the Commission each year those cases in which it
refused to appoint a firm as a SABA dealer, or in which it terminated
such an appointment, refused to conclude a supply contract or witheld
supplies from such a dealer."4
The Commission also sanctioned a selective distribution system
in its decision to exempt from article 85(1) the standard distributor
agreements of Bayerishe Moteren-Werke AG (BMW) for distribution
of its products in Germany upon receipt of proof that BMW had
abandoned export prohibitions that would have applied within the
Common Market. 5 The exempted distributor agreements now enable
BMW to select its dealers on the basis of objective criteria such as
adequate staff, business standing, repair facilities, minimum stocks
and guarantees; moreover, if BMW has reasonable grounds for doing
so, it may require a distributor to refrain from carrying other brands of
automobiles. Although its BMW decision is of a specific nature, the
Commission believes the holding could be of general significance .at
least for the distribution of automobiles because manufacturers or
general importers who wish to apply or establish similar distribution
systems will be able to see what kind of restraints on competition may
be permissible.4 6
The limitations on selective distributorships are important to
United States firms seeking to enter European markets but unwilling
or unable to establish direct selling vehicles. The Commission is likely
to be more tolerant of distributorship restrictions imposed by a firm
seeking a toehold in the market, rather than by a firm seeking to
perpetuate a major market share. At the very least, the United States
firm, whether new to the market or well established, may require that
its dealers meet certain reasonable minimum standards. Under the
43.
44.

9802.
45.

FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 50.
SABA, 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L28) 19 (1976), 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

Bayerishche Motoren Werke A.G., 18 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L29) 1 (1975);

See Commission of the European Communities, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcY 57-60 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT], for the Commission's

analysis of the import of the BMW ruling.
46. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, at 57.
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BMW precedent, it may even be possible to obtain advance clearance
for certain forms of exclusive distributorship arrangements, especially
if the product is new to European markets.
9. Resale Price Maintenance. As indicated by the analysis of
the distributor and dealer cases such as Grundig and BMW, vertical as
well as horizontal agreements come within the reach of article 85.
Resale price maintenance agreements are another important category
of .agreements covered by article 85. Such agreements are prohibited,
however, only if they have the purpose or effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition within the Common Market.
The Commission has stated that as a general rule, resale price
maintenance systems confined to a single member state are essentially
a problem for the competition policy of that member state and not of
immediate concern to the Commission. However, in practice, national
resale price maintenance systems have been tolerated only if competing products from other member states are available. 48 Moreover, one
commentator has observed that under Common Market law, "[it is
simply neither practical nor useful to impose a retail price on one's
retailers if others can purchase one's goods abroad and then undersell
them domestically." 49 Because of this tendency towards market selfregulation it may well be that resale price maintenance is not likely to
be a significant antitrust enforcement topic in the coming years.
10. Price Discrimination. The Commission has not yet held
explicitly that the charging of different prices, except for adjustments
required by variances in shipping and related costs, to purchasers in
different member states violates article 85. Nevertheless, in an appropriate case the Commission probably would so hold because
the Commission is clearly concerned with price disparities
among goods in various Common Market countries ...
Commission responses to questions asked by members of
the European Parliament [for example] reveal the Commission's desire to examine the problem of price differentials in
the automobile industry. Moreover, the Commission's
Fourth Annual Report on Competition Policy notes that,
because rising prices constitute a serious problem for all
47. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 8(1), 218 U.N.T.S. 14, 47, 48, 1
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

2005.

48. See generally, De Richemont, Regulation of Resale Price Maintenance Under
U.S., French, German, British and EEC Law: A ComparativeAnalysis, 5 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 440, 451-62 (1973).
49. Id. at 456.
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Community countries, the Commission has "set itself the
task of examining cases of high price disparities, with the
aim of applying Treaty competition rules in appropriate situations. ""

In Pittsburgh Corning Europe,51 the Commission struck down a
company's use of pricing restrictions to isolate the territories of its
concessionaires because the scheme was deemed to be a parallel
import restriction and therefore anticompetitive, even though some
concessionaries required a higher price to function in their market.
This decision is seen as similar to court holdings in the United States
under the Robinson-Patman Act. 52 Accordingly, the Commission may
be expected to pursue obvious cases where, absent some justification
such as proper freight allowances, purchasers in different countries are
being charged different prices. There is no indication, however, that
the Commission staff is ready to undertake challenges to basing point
systems of pricing, quantity discounts or other such sophisticated but
potentially injurious discriminatory pricing devices that have troubled
United States enforcement authorities for three decades.
C.

Patent Licensing Under Article 85

The antitrust consequences of patent licensing in the Common
Market are rapidly becoming as serious as those in the United States.
Today Common Market patent antitrust law is almost as well developed as that of the United States. Patent antitrust problems under
article 85 have become sophisticated and complex enough to warrant
extensive analysis. However, the discussion in this survey will, of
necessity, simply highlight the most important considerations.
During its first decade of enforcement activity, the Commission's
antitrust analysis of patent license restrictions involved a balancing of
interests comparable to the "rule of reason" approach found in United
States antitrust law. Several recent developments indicate, however,
that the Commission now is developing an approach of "presumptive
illegality" to certain types of license restrictions, and "presumptive
legality" as to other restrictions. In particular, the Commission's
proposed comprehensive guidelines on patent antitrust matters announced in February of 1977, which if enacted in their current form
would permit certain license restrictions previously suspect, clearly
indicate an attempt to bring certainty to this complex legal field.
50. Osterweil, supra note 36, at 102.
51. 14 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L272) 35 (1972), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
2021.432.
52. Finnegan, The Burgeoning Development of the Common Market Competition
Rules and Its Impact on International Licensing, 27 MERCER L. REV. 519, 540 (1976).
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Before reviewing the proposed guidelines, it is necessary to place
them in context. Three years ago, the Court of Justice articulated a
general rule in the Centrafarm case that a patent license provision
which restricted the ability of the licensee to resell across national
boundaries was illegal in virtually all circumstances. 53 Likewise, the
Court held that a series of national patents may not be used to impose
territorial limitations within the EEC. 54 These rulings, which are consistent with the Rome Treaty's primary objective of creating a unified
common market, did not of themselves signal vigorous regulatory
opposition to other forms of license restrictions.
Thereafter, however, it became possible to discern a trend toward
Commission expansion of the Court's application of the Centrafarm
''presumptive illegality" approach to a wide range of licensing restrictions. This trend continues even with the publication of the Commission's proposed guidelines because, with respect to restrictions not
specifically permitted, the Centrafarm approach of "presumptive illegality" remains applicable and possibly reinforced. The proposed
patent guidelines arguably carve out a number of pro-competition
exceptions to previously announced broad prohibitions.
In the AOIP/Beyard case, 55 issued in December of 1975, the
Commission broadly ruled that the following six provisions in the
patent license under review were violative of article 85(1): 1) the
parties agreed to extend the life of the patent beyond its statutory life;
2) the licensee was obligated to pay full royalties after expiration of the
statutory life of the patent; 3) the licensee was prohibited from challenging the validity of the patent; 4) the parties agreed to a noncompete clause, including a restriction on competitive research and
development efforts; 5) the licensee was forbidden to export the
product (provision held illegal even though not enforced); 56 and 6) the
licensee obtained the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the
53. Centrafarm B.V. & Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., [1974 Transfer
8246; Van Zuylen Frres v. Hag A. G. [1974] E.
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230.
54. Centrafarm B.V. & Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., [1974 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246.
55. 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L6) 8(1976), 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9801. This
case involved a license of patents dealing with variable resistor electrical devices.
56. See also the Commission's 1976 settlement in British Broadcasting Corp., EEC
Comm'n Press Release [No. IP (76)35], 2 COMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9819, where BBC
agreed to remove a prohibition against a British toy manufacturer's selling television
cartoon character toys manufactured under license from BBC in the Netherlands. The
Commission was concerned with the fact the BBC had granted the Dutch television
network a license to show its television cartoons thereby raising the presumption that
BBC had established another market for these toys.
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product in France. The Commission suggested, however, that an
exemption for this provision could have been sought article 85(3). 7
The Commission did grant two exemptions to license restrictions
under article 85(3) contemporaneous with its AOIP/Beyard decision.
In both cases, however, the restrictions were found to be reasonably
necessary to guarantee increased production, as 58well as expansion of
the sales base throughout the Common Market.
In early 1976, the Commission's chief antitrust enforcement off icial provided a current summary of potentially troublesome license
restrictions. They include:
1) no challenge clauses; 2) extension of the agreement beyond the life of the most recent patent existing at the time the
agreement was made, unless there is a right for each party to
give notice of termination; 3) non-compete clauses; 4) payment of royalties after the last patent expires; 5) tying agreements; 6) restrictions on the sale of the licensed product
(price fixing or bulk restrictions); 7) exclusivity of sales and
export restrictions which exceed the period necessary for a
new product to penetrate a new market; 8) an obligation for
the licensee to use the licensor's trademark; and 9) a prohibition against the use of the licensor's know-how after the
agreement expires. 59
While the proposed guidelines initially seem to relax substantially
previous prohibitions against various patent license restrictions, the
reality is more complex. Because of this fact, the proposed guidelines
have generated considerable controversy both in Europe and in the
United States. As a result, the guidelines will probably be modified in
some respects before their issuance in final form in 1978. Given this
controversy, United States businesses should closely monitor Commission activity for signals of possible change in the final version of the
guidelines.
Perhaps the most important provision of the lengthy and complicated proposed guidelines is one that would permit licensors to
establish exclusive territorial licenses under article 1, paragraphs 1 and
2. However, paragraphs 1(a) and l(b) of article 2 of the proposed
guidelines respectively provide that such licenses may be granted only
57. 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L6) 8 (1976), 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9801.
58. Kabelmetal-Luchaire, 18 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L222) 34 (1975), [1973-1975
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9761; Boyer AG, Leverkusen & GistBrocades N.V., 18 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C198) 2 (1975), 2 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9770.
59. Schlieder, supra note 5, at 317.
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if the territory covered by the license has a population of less than 100
million people and if the licensor can cancel the license if the licensee
fails to exploit the patent within five years. As a result of the proposal,
a licensor could grant an exclusive license only in a portion of the
Common Market,. for example, Belgium and France. A licensor would
be prohibited from granting such a license, however, in combinations
of larger nations such as France and West Germany, because the total
population of such territory exceeds .the 100 million ceiling. This
represents a significant change from current practices.
On the other hand, there are a number of significant restrictions
that a licensor may impose that are not subject to the territorial
limitation noted above. Under article 1, paragraph 6, of the proposed
guidelines, for example, a licensor would still be able to impose field
of use restrictions. A licensor could also require the licensee to purchase "certain primary products" from a designated source according
to paragraph 11 of article 1. Additionally, article 1, paragraph 14,
would enable a licensor to require a licensee to keep confidential the
licensee's secret manufacturing processes or know-how "facilitating
the use or application of manufacturing techniques".
Article 2, paragraph 2, of the proposed guidelines also would
permit a licensor to impose export prohibitions upon a licensee in a
given territory, but only for a ten year period and only if the annual
sales of licensor and those "enterprises that are legally or economically dependent upon the enterprise involved" do not exceed 100 million
units of account. A licensor would be permitted to prevent a licensee
from issuing sublicenses or making assignments under paragraph 8 of
article 1, to require the licensee to affix a patent trademark to the end
product subject of the license under paragraph 9 of article 1.
Article 3 of the proposed guidelines enumerates many of the same
prohibitions listed in the Centrafarm decision and the Schleider
speech, discussed above. Among the most prominent are prohibitions
against the use of no challenge clauses, price fixing and similar
restraints on use of the licensed products, extensions of the license
beyond the last patent, and certain noncompetition clauses.
The proposed guidelines also limit the use of binding arbitration
to resolve license disputes. Under paragraph 1(16) of article 1 and
paragraph 8 of article 2 of the proposal, the arbitration must be
conducted within the Common Market; the result must be subject to
appeal; and the Commission must be given two months notice before
the award will be effective. There is some speculation that all of these
provisions, except the last-mentioned one, may be removed from the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
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final guidelines. However, this would still give the Commission the
effective power to veto any arbitration award found to be anticompetitive.
Procedurally, the proposed guidelines are announcements of the
kind of license agreements that are likely to be cleared by the Commission pursuant to its authority in article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty.
According to paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 4, the exemptions of the
proposed guidelines would apply prospectively to a particular agreement six months after the Commission receives notice of the agreement, unless the Commission objects within that time. The prospective
application of the exemptions would not be affected by the fact that the
agreement was executed either before or after the effective date of the
guidelines. Thus, the proposed guidelines do not compel the Commission to approve various patent license provisions; rather, the Commission may still consider any particular license restriction in the specific
context in which it arises. Obviously however, the guidelines are likely
to be accurate indicators of the Commission's response in most cases.
The development of these proposed guidelines suggests a continuing Commission regulatory concern for patent antitrust problems. Both
United States and EEC patent antitrust law are developing in a direction that is expanding the rights of licensees. In particular, the United
States firm seeking to license an important product or process with
restrictions upon the conduct of the licensee is sure to face close
scrutiny from the Commission, and perhaps from licensees as well
during negotiations. The fact that the Commission under its proposed
guidelines will play an increasing role in approving licensing agreements should not be ignored.
In December of 1975, the member nations of the Common Market signed the Luxembourg Convention establishing the concept of a
single Community patent granted jointly for all the member states of
the Common Market. 6° Essentially, the agreement provides that, after
a transitional period, a patent grantee will have the choice of relying on
either national patents governed by national law with limited territorial
effect, or the Community patent governed by a body of law contained
in the Luxembourg Convention. Infringement actions based on a
Community patent will still be brought in national courts. The effects
of the Community patent do not, however, extend to the territory of a
member state where there is a prior national patent or patent application.
60. Luxemborg Convention on Community Patent, 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L17)
1(1976). See, EEC Comm'n Press Release (No. 156), 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797.
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AGAINST

A FIRM'S ABUSE OF ITS DOMINANT POSITION

Because it may be used to challenge industry structure as well as
conduct, article 86 is likely to be in the forefront of future Commission
staff antitrust enforcement priorities. Article 86 prohibits the abusive
exploitation of a dominant position in the Common Market or a
substantial part thereof. 6 ' With this focus, article 86 carries the greatest
potential for enforcement activity directed against those United States
based firms which the Commission perceives as unduly influencing or
dominating European markets.
Unlike article 85, there is no provision for exemptions from
article 86. Three elements must be present in order to establish a
violation under article 86: 1) a dominant position; 2) the abuse of that
position; and 3) the likelihood of an effect on trade among member
62
states.
A.

Specific Business Practices As an Abuse of Dominant Position

Article 86 neither defines "dominant position" nor indicates
what might constitute a suspect share of the market. These deficiencies
will continue to vex European and United States firms alike. However,
it is safe to assume that any firm enjoying a fifty percent or more
market share becomes vulnerable to close Commission staff scrutiny,
especially if the market is characterized by a single United States firm
with a large market share and several smaller European firms which
have been unable to obtain more than a foothold in the market.
Article 86, however, does specify certain examples of abusive
practices: 1) unfair pricing and purchasing terms; 63 2) production
61.

Article 86 provides as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertaking of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 14, 70, 1 COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 2101.
62. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpham, & Centrafarm,
[19681 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 81, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8054.
63. An example of unfair pricing terms under article 86 was revealed in the Court of
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allocations which prejudice customers; 3) discrimination; and 4) tie-in
arrangements. However, the definition of abusive practices was refined in Deutsche Grammophon64 and Sirena ,65 where the EEC Court
of Justice explicitly ruled that the mere holding of a patent, copyright
or trademark will not alone constitute a "dominant position", and that
a larger product market therefore must be examined in order to establish a violation of article 86.
The Court in Deutsche Grammophon did give some indication of
what might constitute a violation of article 86. The Court stated that
the difference between a given product price and the price when the
product is reimported from another member state may constitute decisive evidence of an abuse if there is no objective justification for the
price differences. 66 This inference of an abuse from evidence of unjustified price differentials is important for two reasons. First, it reflects
the importance given to price equalization throughout the Common
condemn domiMarket. Second, it indicates the Court's willingness to 67
differentials.
price
in
result
which
activities
nant firm
The reach of article 86 was revealed further in the Commission's
decision in GEMA ,68 a paradigm case of abuse of a dominant position
through certain business practices. In GEMA the Commission held
that a West German organization with a musical copyright management monopoly abused its dominant position in a substantial part of the
Common Market, that is, all of West Germany, by engaging in various
anticompetitive practices. Several of these practices discriminated
against nationals of other Common Market states, for example, discrimination against non-German importers in favor of German importers. The GEMA decision is important in several respects. First, the
Justice's recent decision in General Motors Continental N. V. v. EEC Comm 'n, 2 COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320. At issue were purported excessive fees for vehicle inspection.
GM's Belgian subsidiary had insisted that the inspections could only be performed by it
as the manufacturer. Even though GM reduced the fees and reported overcharges prior
to the Commission's investigation of the matter, the Commission found a violation of
article 86. The Court of Justice reversed this aspect of the decision.
64. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH &
Co. KG, 119711 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8106.
65. Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH, [1971] C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 69, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

66.
Co. KG,
(CCH)
67.
68.

8101.

Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH &
[1971] C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
8106.
Hawk, supra note 6, at 283.
GEMA, 14 J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L134) 15 (1971), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder]

COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

9438.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss2/5

22

Sierck: Emerging Common Market Antitrust Enforcement Trends: A Survey
440

CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 7

relevant geographic market for article 86 purposes was limited to West
Germany, which was held to meet the criterion of a "substantial part"
of the Common Market. 69 Second, in a subsequent observation as to
the scope of the GEMA opinion, the Commission gave a broad, but
somewhat circular, reading to the concept of "abuse":
It is the [monopoly] situation which makes the abuse possible. . . . There is abusive exploitation of the market from
a dominant position when the holder of the position uses the
possibilities which flow from it in order to obtain advantages
which he would not have obtained if there were effective
competition.7"
In its First Annual Report7 , the Commission explained that an
abuse cannot be discerned in accordance with a model of predetermined conduct, but can be established only by taking into account the
objectives of the EEC Treaty. The Commission commented in particular that GEMA underscored the fact that the aim of article 86 is to
prevent firms in a dominant position from obstructing the establishment of undistorted competition in the Common Market. 72
In the Commercial Solvents case, 73 the Court of Justice upheld
the decision of the Commission that Commercial Solvents, a United
States based multinational firm, had violated article 86 by abusing its
dominant position in the market of intermediate chemical products for
an antituberculosis drug, ethambutol, which it manufactured. Commercial Solvents was found to have caused its fifty-one percent owned
subsidiary, ICI, to terminate sales of an essential ingredient of ethambutol to an Italian firm which manufactured ethambutol in competition
with Commercial Solvents and which was unable to secure that material from any other source.
In 1975, the Commission rendered an important decision under
article 86 that the United States firm, United Brands, in the marketing
of its Chiquita brand bananas, had abused its dominant position in the
Common Market, particularly in Germany, Denmark, Ireland and the
69. The Commission's Director General for Competition has observed that dominant positions in the Common Market as a whole are "quite rare"; thus, most interest is
generally directed to the question of what part of the Community can be considered as
"substantial". Schlieder, supra note 5, at 324.
70. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 78.
71. Id. at 79. See also notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 75-77.
73. Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano, S.p.A. Commercial Solvents Corp. v. EEC
Comm'n, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8209.
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Benelux countries. 74 Overall, United Brands was found to have maintained a forty percent share of the entire EEC banana market. The forty
percent figure, however, should not be deemed the minimum share
necessary to trigger article 86 interest. The Commission also found
that it was the only firm in the Common Market to be fully integrated
in that United Brands owned numerous plantations in tropical banana
growing countries and a fleet of refrigerated banana boats, and controlled banana ripening facilities in consumer countries in the Common
Market. The Commission also was persuaded that United Brands'
efforts at producing price differences by means of promotional campaigns featuring its own Chiquita brand were cause for remedial action
under article 86.
The Commission found United Brands abused its dominant position in the following ways: 1) it prevented its distributors from reselling green bananas (because ripe yellow bananas are perishable, only
green bananas can be sold to medium or long distance customers); 2) it
charged significantly different prices at different Common Market
ports; 3) it charged unfairly high prices to customers in Germany,
Denmark and the Benelux countries; and 4) it refused for two years,
for no objectively valid reason, to supply one of its main Danish
customers. Because the Commission believe United Brands' violations
to be serious, it levied a one million unit of account fine on the
company. Additionally, United Brands was required to file reports
with the Commission on the status of its compliance with the various
75
prohibitions of the decision.
In its Fifth Annual Report, the Commission stated:
The importance of this decision lies in the fact that the
Commission investigated a firm's entire marketing policy in
light of Article 86, not so as to attack its commercial dynamism and economic performance, since this is not the purpose of Article 86, but because a dominant firm has an
obligation not to indulge in business practices which are at
variance with the goals of integrated markets and undistorted
competition in the common market.76
The Commission further defined "abuse of dominant positition"7 7
under article 86 in its 1976 decision in Hoffman-La Roche and Co.
74. United Brands, 5 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800. For extensive discussion of
this case, see Swan, The EEC United Brands Decision: Can Chiquita Banana Find
Happiness in Europe?, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 385 (1977).
75. United Brands, 5 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800, 9782.
76. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 59.
77. F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9583, appealpending.
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There, the Swiss based pharmaceutical firm was found to have held a
dominant position with regard to seven types of common vitamins, and
to have abused that position by entering into a number of exclusive or
preferential supply contracts with many of the Common Market's
major bulk vitamin users which add the vitamins to their own
medicines, foods and foodstuffs. According to the Commission's press
release, Hoffman-La Roche virtually cornered this market for vitamins
by use of the exclusive supply contracts, foreclosing its chief competitors from access to this market.7 8 The Commission also found that
the Hoffman-La Roche contracts violated article 86 because they
provided for so-called "fidelity rebates" based on the share of the
customer's requirements purchased from Hoffman-La Roche and not
on differences in the costs related to the quantities supplied. 79
The Hoffman-LaRoche and United Brands cases demonstrate
that the Commission is becoming more agressive in its use of article
86. This trend is likely to continue. One can expect future Commission
investigative activity under article 86 to concentrate on the activities of
United States firms for at least two reasons. First, certain European
markets are dominated by United States based multinationals. Second,
such dominance stands in the way of European economic self-determination.
A pending Commission investigation in the fertilizer industry,
discussed infra, may signal a' trend of increased investigations of the
activities of United States firms doing business in Europe. It is certainly evidence of a notable evolution in Commission antitrust enforcement policy as the Commission delves into more sophisticated, "second-generation" antitrust problems.
Evidence of this evolution of enforcement policy, with its apparent concern over the role of multinationals in the European economy,
may also be seen in the Commission's survey of multinational companies. While this survey was not conducted by the Commission's
78. European Community Information Service, Release No. 25/1976 (June 11,
1976).
79. This violation, though, is premised on the fact that Hoffman-La Roche already
had a dominant position, and that this too was mere abuse of it. The Commission's
determination follows a similar ruling of the Court of Justice in its 1975 sugar cartel
decision. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 26-28, Suiker Unie UA v. Comm'n
[1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
8334. In addition, the Court of Justice's
determination in the sugar cartel case that an abuse of dominant position illegal under
article 86 is shown where any firm exploits its dominant position to force dealers to
channel their exports to specific consignees or areas and to oblige their customers to
accept these restrictions, thus limiting the dealers' and, indirectly, their customers'
markets. Id. at 28.
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antitrust authorities, it does support the thesis that United States based
multinationals play a major role in the European economy. However,
at the same time, a clear inference from the report is that compilation
of more data is necessary before the Commission can make informed
judgments as to whether and what type of structural changes are
necessary in particular industries.
The report noted that in three countries, the United States, Britain
and Germany, are located the headquarters of sixty percent of all the
world's multinational corporations. 80 More importantly, the report
revealed that the 1,202 United States multinationals responding to the
Commission's survey reported a 1973 "turnover" or gross sales of
737 billion units of account, compared with 516 billion for the 2,493
EEC multinationals. 8' As a result of this disparity, the authors of the
report concluded by asking whether this is not a clear indication of the
approach to adopt regarding the regulation of multinationals in Europe.
[T]he figures would certainly appear to lend support to an
idea frequently expressed in Community circles-that the
development of European transnational companies should
be promoted in order to counterbalance multinationals based
outside the Community. "Multinationals based outside the
Community" is becoming an increasingly tortuous, if diplomatically necessary, euphemism
for designating the power
82
of American multinationals.
Not only does the Commission now have the incentive to increase
enforcement activities under article 86, it is also beginning to have the
capability to do so. Now that the Commission has reduced the backlog
of agreements filed for review and has curbed such traditional abuses
as horizontal market divisions under article 85, the Commission staff
will be able to concentrate its efforts in new directions.
The fertilizer investigation 83 referred to previously, is illustrative
of this apparent new direction in enforcement, and warrants discussion
in some detail. The Commission began its investigation as a result of
charges by European phosphate fertilizer companies that their United
States competitors, who benefit from low cost raw materials, have
been able to sell fertilizer in Europe at a lower cost than European
producers. In particular, the European firms claimed that United States
80. This report has been made available to some segments of the European press.
This analysis is based upon an account in 322 EUROPE REPORT 6 (weekly ed. June 12,
1976).
81. Id. at 6.
82. Id.
83. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 80-81.
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phosphate producers charged United States fertilizer firms $15 per
short ton for phosphate rock, while selling it to Common Market firms
for $35 per short ton. The European firms also claim that United States
companies have offered them access to 84cheap rock under conditions
designed to obtained control over them.
As a first step in its investigation, the Commission has requested
through the United States State Department that the United States
Justice Department supply it with information verifying the phosphate
rock pricing disparities alleged by the European fertilizer firms. The
Justice Department's Foreign Commerce Section is likely to work
closely with the Commission staff in this matter because the Foreign
Commerce Section is currently conducting a massive federal grand
jury investigation of the entire United States fertilizer industry.
That investigation resulted in numerous indictments in July,
1976, charging five major producers of potash, an ingredient of most
fertilizers, with conspiring to coordinate potash production, prices and
exports in United States and Canada. 85 Although the defendants in that
case were acquitted, other aspects of the investigation, including the
operation of alleged international cartels, are still being presented to
grand juries and may result in further indictments. In turn, if the
Common Market authorities can remedy the alleged abuses of which
the European fertilizer companies complain, the European market
shares, United States firms exporting to the Common Market surely
will be reduced substantially.
The importance to United States firms of the Commission investigation is twofold. First, it concentrates strictly on the United States
firms. Second, it reveals that United States and Common Market
authorities are working closely on an informal basis to develop a major
antitrust case. In light of the fertilizer investigation, it is possible that
the nonferrous metals, uranium and pharmaceutical industries, among
others, may be subject to similar treatment by the Commission. These
industries are already under close regulatory scrutiny in the United
States for allegedly maintaining international cartels. Other industries
are also under scrutiny simply because they are highly concentrated. If
the Common Market were to conduct parallel or follow-up investigations, the United States based producers would surely be among the
primary targets.
84. 117 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY A-12 (August 3, 1976) (BNA).
85. U.S. v. Amax Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,076. On May 6, 1977, a
federal district court judge acquitted three of the defendants in the criminal case.
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B.

Mergers as an Abuse of Dominant Position under Article 86
At present, European firms and even United States based multinationals may undertake routine acquisitions without challenge by the
Commission. This will soon change, however, if the Commission
enacts its proposed merger restraint policy, which would result in
curtailing acquisitions of independent European firms by United States
based multinationals.
Currently, article 86 is of limited utility in controlling mergers,
because its provisions only apply after the merger has taken place and
only if the merger is found to be an abuse of dominant position.86 In the
Common Market a merger cannot be blocked before consummation as
it can in the United States, although the Commission can institute
proceedings immediately after consummation and consequently need
not await the accumulation of evidence showing an actual adverse
competitive impact. As they stand now, articles 85 and 86 are properly
perceived as insufficient "for a systematic merger control which is
necessary to assure workable competition ' 87 within the European
Community.
Continental Can88 was the Commission's test case for its theory
that article 86 can be applied to challenge acquisitions made by a firm
already enjoying a dominant position. The Commission has not challenged any merger as an illegal combination under article 85. Notably,
the Commission picked an acquisition by a United States based multinational to establish its theory.
This case stemmed from Continental Can's plan to merge its
German subsidiary, the largest producer of light metal cans in continental Europe, with a Dutch firm which was the largest producer of
containers in the Benelux countries. While the Court of Justice overruled the Commission's findings as to the facts of the case, particularly
its findings dealing with relevant product markets, the Court did
approve the Commission's decision that article 86 may be used to
challenge changes in market structure as well as abusive practices. The
86. Moreover, merger enforcement has not been vigorous in spite of a wave of
mergers among Common Market firms in the last decade because of political and
economic factors, including the French government's interest in protecting its expansion-minded corporations and the opinion of many EEC officials that "border crossing
mergers" tend to reduce a chauvinistic tendency among executives of the merging
companies. Scherer, Secrecy, the Rule of Reason, and European Merger Control Policy,
19 ANTITRUST BULL. 181, 182, 184 (1974).
87. Schlieder, supra note 5, at 327.
88. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. EEC Comm'n, [1973] C. J.
Comm. E. Rec. 77, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder) COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171.
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Court in essence held that article 86 could prevent enterprises from
achieving through merger that which they were not permitted under
89
article 85 to accomplish by way of agreement.
Finally, the Commission's opinion in Continental Can is
noteworthy because it states in general terms the Commission's view
as to what constitutes a "dominant position" under article 86:
Undertakings are in a dominant position when their scope for
independent behavior is such that they can act without making substantial allowance for competitors, buyers or suppliers. This is the case when, owing either to their share of
the market, or their share of the market coupled with the
situation in connection or respect of technical knowledge,
raw materials, or capital, they are able to determine prices or
control production or distribution of a significant share of
the products in question."
The emphasis in Continental Can focused on the vast technological and financial resources of the acquiring firm, on its multinational
character and the consistent market leadership it has exhibited. This
emphasis suggests
a concern for sheer size-and inconsistent modes of market
behavior-which may be incompatible with the kind of marketplace the Commission is attempting to build. This factor
of overall size is one which may emerge as an independent
aspect of Commission policy.9 1
C. The Proposed Regulation of the Control of Mergers
In its Third Annual Report, the Commission expressed its belief
that "the time has come for the European Community to take powers
to exercise more systematic control over mergers." ' 92 Under current
law, mergers can only be challenged insofar as they manifest the
requisite abuse of dominant position. Moreover, the Commission,
89. Since Continental Can, the Commission has issued a Proposed Concentration
Regulation, to be discussed in the next section of this article, which seeks to lessen the
Commission's burden in merger cases. The proposed regulation requires merger prenotification and gives the Commission the effective power to block mergers prior to
consummation in some cases. See generally, Note, EEC Antitrust-An Exercise in Prior
Restraint, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 143, 151-52 (1975).
90. This is an unofficial Commission translation reprinted in Van der Esch, Abuse
of a Dominant Position in Community Law, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, CORPORATE LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 132 (1974).
91.
INT'L L.
92.
PETITION

Note, Common Market Merger Policy: Sources and Development, 14 VA. J.
501, 518 (1974).
Commission of the European Communities, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPOLICY 33 n.29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as THIRD ANNUAL REPORT].

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977

29

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1977], Art. 5
ANTITRUST

ENFORCEMENT

TRENDS

even after Continental Can, can do very little to prevent United States
firms from continuing to make acquisitions of major European businesses.
This does not mean, however, that the Common Market is ready
to import in its entirety section 7 of the Clayton Act. 93 Indeed, the
Commission still recognizes that acquisitions may often be the only
practicable way of restoring desired competition in a market otherwise
94
completely dominated by a firm with a high rate of internal growth.
However, it is the European firm, rather than the United States firm,
that is likely to benefit from this position.
As a result of its concerns about mergers leading to concentration
in the Common Market, the Commission, on July 20, 1973, sent to the
Community Council for approval a proposal for a regulation governing
the "Control of Concentrations between Undertakings". 95 The main
provisions are as follows:
1) Concentrations which give the power to hinder effective
competition are incompatible with the Common Market.
Concentrations on a smaller scale which do not give such
power are not caught by this rule as long as they do not
exceed certain quantitative limits. In making these determinations, competition in the world market must be considered.
2) Concentrations which are indispensable to the attainment of an objective given priority treatment by the
Community may be held not to be incompatible with the
Common Market.
3) Concentrations (including joint ventures) involving firms
with aggregate sales of 1,250 million of units of account
are subject to prior notification, after which the Commission has three months during which it may initiate
proceedings.
4) Legal transactions which have taken place in connection
with a concentration which is declared incompatible with
the Common Market are not void.
During 1974 and 1975, the Council's Working Party on Economic Questions deliberated upon the proposed merger regulation. According to the Commission, its 1975 deliberations were deferred, however,
until the outcome of the June referendum in the United Kingdom as to
93. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, tit. 111, 38 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 18, 29 U.S.C.).
94. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 33 n.29.
95. Id. at 33.
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whether to continue its membership in the Common Market.96 Council
discussions have been "concentrating on the definition of the scope of
97
the regulation and the criteria set out in article 1," set forth above.
During 1976, the Council's Working Party met on March 23 to
consider the proposed merger regulation; no action was taken at this
meeting. This fact indicates that the proposed merger regulation probably will not be adopted in the near future.
The crucial provision of the proposed regulation is article 1,
which prohibits mergers which "give the power to hinder effective
competition." 98 Assuming the proposed regulation is enacted into law,
the real issue is how that standard will be applied, particularly in view
of the requirement that the merger's effect on the world market must be
considered. It does seem certain, however, that proposed article 1 will
be applied to the relative disadvantage of major United States firms.
Aquisitions by powerful United States multinationals can be challenged under proposed article 1 because of being perceived as giving
the firm "power to hinder effective competition". Moreover, article 1,
in its concern for the impact on the world market, would sanction
defensive mergers by European firms consummated on the ground of
affording more vigorous and efficient competition to United States
based competitors. As a simple example, if article 1 were enacted, it is
extremely unlikely that the Commission would permit General Motors
to acquire Fiat (United States antitrust law notwithstanding), whereas
Fiat and British Leyland might be encouraged to combine to confront
General Motors with greater competition on a worldwide basis.
D.

The Commission's Special Oil Industry Investigation

The Commission's Special Oil Industry Investigation 99 gives
further indication of its increased concern for the consequences of the
conduct and structure of markets dominated by large United States
multinationals.
On December 15, 1975, the Commission released the findings of
its two year investigation of the behavior of the major oil companies in
the Common Market during the period of the Middle East oil crisis,
October, 1973, to March, 1974. The purpose of the investigation was
96.

FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 15 n.8.

97. Id.
98. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 32.

99. Report by the Commission on the Behavior of the Oil Companies in the
Community During the Period from October 1973 to March 1974 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Oil Report] (copy on file with CALIF. W. INT'L L. J.).
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to determine exactly what the oil companies did during the oil crisis
and whether such conduct violated the EEC's rules of competition,
specifically articles 85 and 86. The focus of the Commission's investigation was on the Netherlands and Italy, which traditionally had excess
refining capacity and which accordingly were sources of supply to
countries with insufficient refining capacity, especially Germany. The
report gave indications as to what sort of oil company conduct might
be challenged in the future. The Commission also announced that it
contemplates further investigation and possible action in a number of
areas.
In its December 21, 1973, press release announcing the investigation, the Commission stated:
Refusal by the big [oil] companies to supply the independent
distributors in an equitable manner may give rise to an application of the competition rules of the Treaty and in particular
Article 86 thereof.
The same holds good for practices which consist in the big
companies applying to their trading partners different conditions for the provision of equivalent services or subjecting
the signature of contracts to the acceptance by their partners
of extra services.100
The press release proved to be an accurate indicator of the Commission's findings and concerns. The Commission concluded that, as a
result of the oil shortage, Common Market oil refiners "in general saw
their position strengthened to such an extent that, collectively, they
acquired a dominant position in the oil market."''
The refiners
achieved this dominance because, owing to the oil shortage, customers
had no alternate sources of supply. As a result, during the shortage
each of the companies with refining capacities in a given country
became the sole and "imposed" supplier of refined products to all of
10 2
those dealers and consumers who were its traditional customers.
Of long-term importance is the Commission's stated concern
about the behavior of the big oil companies even though the oil
shortage has abated. Any future Commission investigations or enforcement action affecting the Common Market oil refining industry
probably will focus on the following three areas.
1. Joint Ventures. In its Fifth Annual Report, released five
months after issuance of the oil shortage report, the Commission
100. Id. at 2.
101. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 17-18.
102. Id.
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summarized its apprehension as to the anticompetitive impact of the
joint ventures pervading the industry:
Whether in the case of actual joint ventures, exchanges
of refining capacities or transfers of products, the large
companies are limited by an extensive network of relationships which, even if there are good historical and economic
reasons for them, constitute nonetheless a factor in
strengthening their solidarity and consolidating their position.
The Commission will remain alert to the posibility that,
by forging more and more of these links, the companies
might create together a situation which would limit the scope
for effective competition. ° 3
Nevertheless, five major European oil companies, Societe
Nationale Elf-Acquitaine, Cie. Francaise des Petroles (both of
France), Veba AG of Germany, Petrofina S.A. of Belgium and Ente
Nationale Idrocarbori of Italy recently have informed the Commission
that they propose, subject to Commission approval, to cooperate on
pricing policy, oil exploration and energy conservation in order,
04
among other reasons, to improve price structures and profitability.1
The Commission's response to this request should be an important
indication of the future of antitrust policy not only with respect to the
oil companies, but also as to other combinations proposed in response
to market dominance by other larger multinationals.
2. Price Discrimination Among Member States. The Commission believes that the reliance of international oil firms on certain
customary systems for publishing price data, for example Platt's Oilgram, which the Commission specifically mentioned, "raises some
real problems concerning the correctness of prices." 10 5 This observation arose in the context of the Commission's concern over possible
103. Id. at 16.
104. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15, 1976, at 20, col. 2.
105. Oil Report, supra note 99, at 123. According to the Commission,
[u]nlike the world-wide commodities, such as copper or sugar, the prices of oil
products are not quoted on any international exchange, and the Platt's Oilgram
quotations, although unofficial, have acquires [sic] some significance as a
market indicator. They are used extensively by oil companies in determining
their transfer and sale prices. Governments have also taken quotations into
consideration when determining their prices for oil products.
Id. at 115. The Commission observed further that
[e]very effort is undoubtedly made to ensure that the data used in the compilation of Platt's Oilgram quotations are absolutely up to date, but the actual
criteria for interpreting the data given and the means of determining the daily
quotations are unknown, as indeed are the sources of the information themselves.
Id. at 123.
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abuses in transfer pricing, that is, the intracompany price that the
vertically integrated oil company "charges itself" during the several
transactions from the oil field to the gas pump. The Commission insists
upon accurate pricing so that it can determine whether there is any
unwarranted difference in price between oil sold by one firm in two
member nations. According to the Commission,
[i]t is this disparity between real costs and transfer prices
which gave rise to accusations against the oil companies that
they were operating price systems which were so complex
that they could cover up any form of manipulation. Indeed
all the systems which they operate certainly do lack clarity
and logic, permitting uncheckable calculations to be made.'06
3. Suppression Of Independent Firms. In the course of its
investigation, the Commission gave special attention to the possibility
of abuse of single firm dominance by certain companies in their
relations with independent dealer-customers.
The Commission takes the view that, during the crisis, all the
large oil companies individually were in a dominant position,
at least in respect of their traditional customers, who had no
access to suppliers other than those with whom they had
done business. A refusal to sell to such customers can constitute an abuse forbidden by Article 86 since it may affect
trade between Member States, which is certainly the case
when a sizeable purchaser/dealer is in danger of being
squeezed out of the market, a development which would
mean appreciable change in the pattern of supply of oil
products in a substantial part of the common market.° 7
This concern is clearly an attempt to prevent small or medium sized
European businesses from being crippled or destroyed by the major
European oil refineries, most of whom are affiliates of major vertically
integrated United States oil companies.
The Commission's Report, however, concluded that transfer
prices of crude oil and refined products had virtually no effect on
market prices at the time of the Middle East oil crisis. Ultimately, the
Commission determined that
it is in the terms under which the various companies supplying the market obtain their supplies that the factors governing price levels in the times of crisis, as in time of market
stability, are to be found.
106. Id.at 132.
107. Id.at 151.
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As regards crude oil, the major companies, which for a long
time have had an almost exclusive control of Middle East oil,
have established very close relationships with producer
countries and, despite the gradual disappearance of concession oil, still benefit directly or indirectly from privileged
purchasing conditions in countries where production costs
are in any case the lowest. With respect to crude oil then, the
other companies are subject from the outset to a handicap
which is felt at all steps right up to the finished product."°8
4. Other Investigations. As a follow-up of its investigation,
the Commission also expressed its intent to make inquiries into the
kerosene and naptha product markets because of perceived oligopolies
and oligopsonies.'09 The Commission also plans to make further inquiry into the oil companies' public supply contracts with electricity
companies. 0
5. Limitations On The Scope Of Future Enforcement Action
Affecting The Major Oil Companies. In spite of its concerns, the
Commission's Report on the Oil Companies ultimately does not reveal
pronounced hostility towards the big oil companies, even those based
in the United States. The Commission appears satisfied simply to
exercise an increased supervisory role with the aim of preserving the
smaller nonintegrated firms. Indeed, the Commission seems to have
taken a somewhat "hands off" attitude towards the major oil firms.
It also emerges from this report that during the crisis the
dissimilar actions by member states were aimed at the urgent
introduction of measures and gave the impression of an
"every man for himself" approach, which was scarcely in
the Community spirit.
During the same period because of their international
standing and experience, the oil companies made an important contribution to alleviating for the countries of the Community, the serious repercussions on their suppliers of the
decisions taken by the oil producing countries.
This same crisis served, in fact, to highlight how effective and indispensable their influence is, and to bring home
to economic observers and to the general public the power
wielded by these large companies and the limitations of any
attempt at state intervention."'
108. Id. at 128.
109. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 21.
110. Id.
11. Oil Report, supra note 99, at 153.
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It thus may be that major United States oil companies, at least in
the near future, need not expect the Commission to demand the sort of
radical structural changes now being promoted in the United States by
the Congress and by the Federal Trade Commission. Nonetheless, the
Commission may attempt to curb specific oil company practices that
hinder the development of European competitors.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Common Market's antitrust enforcement mechanism is now
approaching maturity. Many of the obvious, "first generation" abuses
such as territorial restrictions in licensing agreements are now being
eliminated. In the process, the Commission has developed, at least in
certain areas such as licensing and distribution, a rational and reasonably predictable enforcement policy.
As a result, the Commission can now devote greater investigative
and enforcement efforts to the more sophisticated "second generation" problems presented both by restrictive practices or conduct and
by the very structure of product markets themselves. The oil company
and fertilizer investigations are illustrative. So, too, is the development
of the proposed regulation on control of mergers. Also noteworthy is
the increased cooperation among antitrust officials of the Common
Market, the United States, and other OECD nations. However, as
indicated in both the multinational and the big oil studies, the primary
obstacle to second generation policy development is the logistical one
of information access and data reduction.
The conclusion appears inescapable that future Commission enforcement activity will impact more heavily than before on United
States business for at least two reasons, especially as more cases are
brought under article 86. First, United States based multinationals still
include some of the most potent private economic organizations in
Europe and, unlike a number of their French and British counterparts,
have long operated throughout the entire Common Market. Second,
the Commission's interest in the development of a Common Market
and, in particular, its concern for the need of smaller firms to develop
greater competitive resources, reflects the European Community's
apparent desire for greater economic self-determination. If this selfdetermination can be achieved only at the expense of United States
based multinationals, then the Commission is likely to respond accordingly.
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